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SHOULD”—WHY MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND 
OF POTTAWATOMI INDIANS v. PATCHAK AND CARCIERI 
v. SALAZAR MUST BE LEGISLATIVELY OVERRIDDEN TO 
PROTECT THE IRA TRUST ACQUISITION AUTHORITY 
Kendall McCoy
*
 
Introduction 
Land ownership allows for the preservation of distinct nationhood, 
making it central to the sovereignty of Indian tribes.
1
 Tribes have certain 
rights as distinct nations due to their legal status as separate governments 
that pre-exist the Constitution.
2
 They have inherent sovereignty as self-
governing peoples.
3
 But because Indian tribes are “domestic dependent 
nations” that have protectorate relationships with the United States, they do 
not have all attributes of sovereignty.
4
 Due to this state of dependency, 
Congress has plenary power over the affairs with and of the Indian tribes, 
and Congress uses that power to decide the “metes and bounds of tribal 
sovereignty,” exclusive of the states.5 This plenary power also gave rise to 
the federal-tribal trust relationship, which dictates, among other things, that 
the federal government must protect tribal property.
6
 
Treaties served as the earliest negotiating tool between Indian tribes and 
the United States, and special canons of construction arose from that 
tradition.
7
 These canons, when applied, serve to rectify the inequality 
inherent in these early agreements, which were not “arm’s-length 
transaction[s]” but compacts which tribes had “imposed upon them [with] 
no choice but to consent.”8 Therefore, any treaty or statute relating to 
                                                                                                             
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 15.01, at 965 (Nell Jessup Newton 
et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN]. 
 2. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).  
 5. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004).  
 6. Sarah Washburn, Distinguishing Carcieri v. Salazar: Why the Supreme Court Got It 
Wrong and How Congress and Courts Should Respond to Preserve Tribal and Federal 
Interests in the IRA’s Trust-Land Provisions, 85 WASH. L. REV. 603, 605 (2010).  
 7. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.03[1], at 26.  
 8. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970).  
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Indians must be liberally construed for the benefit of the Indians, 
interpreted “so far as possible” as the Indians would have understood it, and 
read with all ambiguities resolved in their favor.
9
 These canons are “rooted 
in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians” 
and are essential to the protection of tribal rights.
10
  
When the Supreme Court ignores the Indian canons and disregards the 
federal trust obligation, there are devastating consequences for Indian 
Country, especially in the tribal property arena. In the 2012 case of Match-
E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak (“Patchak 
I”),11 the Court considered whether an individual had standing to divest the 
federal government of its title to Indian trust land.
12
 David Patchak, a 
neighbor to a parcel of land that was taken into trust for the Match-E-Be-
Nash-She-Wish Band, challenged the acquisition under the Administrative 
Procedure Act by alleging “economic, environmental, and aesthetic harms” 
from the parcel’s use for gaming.13 The government argued that the Quiet 
Title Act, which retained the sovereign immunity of the United States 
concerning land it already held in trust for tribes, barred the suit.
14
 The 
Supreme Court held that the Quiet Title Act was not applicable when the 
challenging plaintiff did not assert its own title to the land.
15
 It further held 
that a neighboring landowner did have standing to challenge an already 
completed trust acquisition and remanded Patchak’s suit for further 
proceedings.
16
 Patchak I further unsettled the fee-to-trust process, which 
had already been rocked by the 2009 decision of Carcieri v. Salazar.
17
 In 
Carcieri, the Supreme Court limited the use of the Indian Reorganization 
Act
18
 authority to take land into trust by restricting the avenue to only tribes 
under federal jurisdiction in 1934, the year the Act was passed.
19
 
                                                                                                             
 9. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Choctaw 
Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943); Alaska Pac. Fisheries Co. v. 
United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).  
 10. Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).  
 11. 567 U.S. 209 (2012).  
 12. Id. at 214.  
 13. Id. at 212 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706). 
 14. Id. at 215 (citing Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2018)).  
 15. Id. at 215-24. 
 16. Id. at 224-28.  
 17. 555 U.S. 379 (2009). 
 18. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5129 
(2018)). 
 19. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 394. 
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Application of the Indian canons likely would have resulted in victories for 
tribal interests, or at least fewer negative consequences.
20
  
The Supreme Court provided a narrow remedy for its prior meddling in 
Indian property rights when it decided Patchak v. Zinke (“Patchak II”)21 in 
2018. While Patchak’s initial suit was on remand, Congress passed the Gun 
Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act,
22
 requiring dismissal of any pending 
federal action relating to the land at issue in Patchak I.
23
 By plurality 
opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of Congress to enact such 
legislation, holding that it did not violate Article III of the Constitution.
24
 
The Supreme Court explained that the Gun Lake Act did not impermissibly 
compel a certain result under old law but instead changed the law via a 
valid exercise of legislative power.
25
 As a result, Patchak’s suit was 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
26
 
Although the Patchak II remedy seems to lessen the barriers created by 
Carcieri and Patchak I, it presumes that tribes are able to exercise enough 
political influence on Congress to pass special laws each time a trust 
acquisition is challenged.
27
 Such piecemeal legislation is expensive, 
inefficient, and ineffectual, as it likely provides relief to very few, if any, 
tribes. This Note argues that because the remedy provided by Patchak II 
does not go far enough, Congress must instead override the Patchak and 
Carcieri decisions. Part I provides a brief history of Indian property rights. 
Part II outlines Patchak as it twice made its way through the Supreme 
Court. Part III analyzes the confluence of Patchak I and Carcieri, the 
implications of the remedy provided by Patchak II, and the reasons for a 
larger legislative fix.  
I. History of Indian Property Rights  
Since the founding of the United States, Congress has variously used its 
plenary power to restrict tribal sovereign authority or to relax previous 
                                                                                                             
 20. Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act at 25: Successes, 
Shortcomings, and Dilemmas, FED. LAW., Apr. 2013, at 35, 38-39.  
 21. 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).  
 22. Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014). 
 23. Id. at 902-03.  
 24. Id. at 906. 
 25. Id. at 908 (referencing Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act § 2(b), 128 Stat. at 
1913). 
 26. Id. at 904.  
 27. Id. at 910.  
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restrictions, leading to cognizable eras in the federal-tribal relationship.
28
 
These Indian policies, which were “applicable to numerous tribes . . . [and] 
affect[ed] billions of acres of land,” necessarily shifted with the needs of 
the United States.
29
 This is especially apparent regarding tribal property 
interests.
30
 Under the controlling property regime of the United States, 
tribal property interests are split between the federal government, which 
holds ultimate title, and the Indian tribes, which retain aboriginal title and a 
right of occupancy subject to alteration or complete divestment at the will 
of the federal government.
31
 As national Indian policies have fluctuated 
over the centuries, so too has the strength (and even the existence) of tribal 
property rights.  
A. Federal Indian Policy Eras, 1789 to Present 
During the period of treaty-making following the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1789, tribes were required to trade large tracts of their 
ancestral territories for goods, services, and the right to continue self-
governance under the protection of the United States.
32
 But as the United 
States’ population grew, so did the demand for land in the South and East 
Coast regions.
33
 Forced removal became the dominant strategy to 
extinguish Indian title.
34
 In exchange for relinquishing their rights to the 
entirety of their eastern homelands, removed tribes were given new 
territories in the west.
35
 Following many acts of brutality, coercion, and 
fraud, most tribes had been removed from the eastern states by 1850.
36
 To 
exact further control and isolation, the reservation system developed, 
whereby tribes were concentrated onto small sections of land and provided 
animals, tools, and an education in an effort to civilize and prepare them for 
assimilation.
37
 
By the late nineteenth century, the national policy of segregating entire 
tribes onto reservations shifted to allotting those reservation lands to tribal 
                                                                                                             
 28. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  
 31. See Johnson v, M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 585 (1823).  
 32. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.03[1], at 29.  
 33. Id. § 1.03[4][a], at 45-48. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. § 1.03[4][a], at 45-48, 54. 
 36. Id. § 1.03[4][a], at 54. 
 37. Id. § 1.03[6][a], at 64-65. 
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members individually.
38
 The General Allotment Act, also known as the 
Dawes Act, was passed in 1887.
39
 Its basic objectives were to “extinguish 
tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the assimilation 
of Indians into the society at large.”40 Each individual Indian was allotted a 
parcel, usually 160 acres of grazing land or eighty acres of agricultural land, 
the patent to which was held by the United States in trust for that individual 
allottee for a period of twenty-five years.
41
 Following that period, the patent 
was discharged of the trust, and the allottee received the land in fee.
42
 Any 
reservation land not allotted was declared surplus and opened for non-
Indian settlement, which permanently reshaped and diminished Indian 
Country.
43
 At enactment, Indian landholdings across the lower forty-eight 
states totaled 140 million acres.
44
 During the fifty years that the General 
Allotment Act was the foundation of federal action, that number plunged to 
fifty-two million acres—a staggering loss of ninety million acres from 
Indian control.
45
  
The passage of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)
46
 in 1934 was a 
landmark change in federal policy.
47
 The IRA “put a halt to the loss of tribal 
lands” by repudiating the prior policies of allotment and assimilation.48 It 
also allowed tribes “a greater degree of self-government, both politically 
and economically” by establishing procedures for organizing governments 
and chartering business corporations.
49
 The keystone of the IRA is section 
5, which empowers the Secretary to “acquire . . . any interest in lands . . . 
for the purpose of providing land for Indians,” which allowed for the 
creation, expansion, or restoration of Indian reservations.
50
 Importantly, 
“Indian” is defined in section 19 to include (1) “all persons of Indian 
                                                                                                             
 38. Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 
251, 253-54 (1992).  
 39. Id. at 254 (citing General Allotment Act (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) 
(repealed 2000)). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 3 (1956). 
 42. Id.  
 43. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 43 
(2005). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101-
5129) (reclassified from 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479).  
 47. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151 (1973). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974). 
 50. Indian Reorganization Act § 5, 25 U.S.C. § 5108.  
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descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal 
jurisdiction,” (2) “all persons who are descendants of such members who 
were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian 
reservation,” and (3) “all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.”51 
The Carcieri decision later qualified the first definition, holding that the 
statutory “term ‘now under Federal jurisdiction’ . . . unambiguously refers 
to those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the United States 
when the IRA was enacted in 1934.”52 Accordingly, when a tribe is found 
not to have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934, it is not “Indian” for the 
purposes of section 19, and the Secretary lacks section 5 authority to take 
land into trust for its benefit.
53
 Notwithstanding the IRA and other 
legislation that brought about better and more efficient uses of tribal 
resources, poor economic conditions for tribes continued as before.
54
  
This attempt to foster tribal development was interrupted by another 
period of congressional efforts to sever ties between the federal government 
and Indian tribes in hopes of a “future in which Indians would disappear as 
a distinctive group within the United States.”55 Termination became the 
controlling national policy in 1953 with the passage of House Concurrent 
Resolution 108, which mandated the end of the federal trustee 
relationship.
56
 Later, specific termination legislation allowed for greater 
state involvement in the form of criminal and civil jurisdiction, and for 
some tribes, the liquidation of tribal assets (including reservation 
landholdings) and the end of federal recognition and services.
57
 By the time 
termination was renounced in the 1970s, more than 100 tribes had been 
terminated, affecting 11,000 people and 1.3 million acres—a diminishment 
of 2.5 percent of Indian trust land.
58
 
Indian policy shifted into its modern form during the 1960s in response 
to growing civil rights concerns.
59
 This new perspective recognized tribal 
self-determination and self-governance as the exercise of inherent sovereign 
powers.
60
 Acknowledgement of the nation-to-nation relationships between 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. § 10, 25 U.S.C. § 5129.  
 52. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009).  
 53. Id. at 394-95. 
 54. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.05, at 88.  
 55. FREDERICK E. HOXIE, THIS INDIAN COUNTRY: AMERICAN INDIAN ACTIVISTS AND THE 
PLACE THEY MADE 320 (2012). 
 56. Id. at 327. 
 57. WILKINSON, supra note 43, at 82-84. 
 58. Id. at 81.  
 59. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.07, at 98.  
 60. Id. 
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the federal government and the individual Indian tribes has brought about 
greater tribal involvement in federal policy development.
61
 Such 
collaboration has allowed for legislation and programs that emphasize tribal 
decision-making, cultural preservation, and economic development.
62
 How 
long this respect for self-governance will last is unclear, however, as the 
unique standing of tribes remains open to legislative—and increasingly 
judicial—alteration.  
B. The Fee-to-Trust Statutory Process Prior to Patchak I 
The Secretary of the Interior’s section 5 authority to take land into trust 
under the Indian Reorganization Act is implemented by Department of the 
Interior (DOI) regulations at 25 C.F.R. Part 151.
63
 Land may be taken into 
trust for an Indian tribe when: (1) the land is either already within the 
exterior boundaries of the tribe’s existing reservation or adjacent to it, (2) 
the tribe “already owns an interest in the land,” or (3) the land acquisition is 
“necessary to facilitate tribal self-determination, economic development, or 
Indian housing.”64 Once the land is held in fee by the tribe, it submits an 
application to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to formally begin the fee-
to-trust process; this application requires a legal land description, an 
explanation of why the acquisition is needed, the purpose for which the 
property would be used, and if the property is located off-reservation, a 
business plan or the location of the property relative to state and reservation 
boundaries.
65
 The BIA then gives notice to affected state and local 
governments and allows a thirty-day comment period regarding possible 
impacts to “regulatory jurisdiction, real property taxes, and special 
assessments.”66 Once a final determination is made to take the land into 
trust, notice of the determination is published and if no challenge arises, the 
land comes under tribal jurisdiction, with the United States retaining 
ultimate title.
67
 
The entire land-into-trust process was called into question in South 
Dakota v. United States Department of Interior.
68
 In that case, the Secretary 
                                                                                                             
 61. See id. § 1.07, at 99.  
 62. Id. at 112.  
 63. 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.1-.15(2019).  
 64. Id. § 151.3(a).  
 65. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ACQUISITION OF TITLE TO LAND HELD IN FEE OR 
RESTRICTED FEE STATUS 67-68 (2016).  
 66. 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10, 151.11(d) (2019). 
 67. COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.07[1][b], at 1012.  
 68. 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated, 519 U.S. 919 (1996).  
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asserted before the Eighth Circuit that because a section 5 land acquisition 
was an “agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by law,”69 it 
was not open to judicial review.
70
 This caused the circuit court to consider 
whether the provision violated the nondelegation doctrine, which states that 
Congress cannot delegate its legislative power to any other branch of 
government.
71
 The circuit court explained that although it is permissible for 
Congress to obtain assistance from the other branches, it must first provide 
legislative standards or boundaries that govern the exercise of such a 
delegated power.
72
 Because the language of section 5 provided no boundary 
or guiding principle except that the acquisition be “for Indians,” courts had 
no ascertainable standard against which to test whether that delegated 
discretion had been exercised in a way that furthered congressional intent.
73
 
After concluding that the Secretary had an “unrestricted, unreviewable 
power” to take land into trust, the court held the power invalid as a 
violation of the nondelegation doctrine.
74
  
In response to this decision, and while awaiting a grant of certiorari from 
the Supreme Court, the DOI promulgated a new rule stating that the 
Secretary could not take land into trust until at least thirty days following 
publication of the final agency determination in the Federal Register.
75
 This 
set window of time permitted judicial review of the Secretary’s decision 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) before “formal conveyance 
of title to land to the United States.”76 The DOI specifically established this 
rule on its understanding that the Quiet Title Act (QTA), which “does not 
apply to trust or restricted Indian lands,”77 would preclude judicial review 
once the United States held title to the land at issue. The Eighth Circuit 
decision was later vacated and remanded to the Secretary for 
reconsideration by the Supreme Court, which, although it gave no definite 
ruling, seemed to signal its agreement that the QTA would act as such a 
                                                                                                             
 69. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2018).  
 70. South Dakota, 69 F.3d at 881-82.  
 71. Id. at 881.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 883-85.  
 74. Id. at 884-85. 
 75. 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b) (2011) (amended in 2013). 
 76. Land Acquisitions, 61 Fed. Reg. 18082-01, 18082 (Bureau of Indian Affairs Apr. 
24, 1996) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b)) (amended in 2013).  
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2018). 
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bar.
78
 Indeed, this agency understanding that sovereign immunity barred 
judicial review and title challenges after the land had been taken into trust 
found support in decisions made by the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits.
79
 
II. Statement of the Patchak Cases 
Both Patchak cases center around the decision of the DOI to take land 
into trust for the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi 
Indians. The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians 
(“the Band”), also known as the Gun Lake Tribe, consists of 277 citizens 
and is headquartered in central Michigan.
80
 Despite having existed in that 
area continuously since the turn of the nineteenth century, the Band was 
only formally recognized by the DOI in 1999.
81
 Two years later, after 
acquiring 147 acres of land (“Bradley Property”) in Wayland Township, a 
rural farming community thirty miles from Grand Rapids, the Band 
petitioned the Secretary to take the land into trust under section 5 of the 
IRA.
82
 The application included the Band’s intention to construct and 
operate a casino on the property.
83
  
In 2005, the Secretary issued a formal notice of decision to take the land 
into trust, and pursuant to agency rule, held off completing the transaction 
for thirty days to allow interested parties to seek judicial review.
84
 During 
that period, the Michigan Gambling Opposition (“MichGO”) brought suit in 
the D.C. District Court alleging violations of the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
                                                                                                             
 78. Anna O’Brien, Casenote and Comment, Misadventures in Indian Law: The Supreme 
Court’s Patchak Decision, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 590 (2014) (discussing taking land into 
trust).  
 79. Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians v. Utah, 428 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2005); Neighbors 
for Rational Dev., Inc. v. Norton, 379 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Patchak I, 
567 U.S. 209 (2012); Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. United States, 830 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 
1987), abrogated by Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209; Fla. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation v. Dep’t of 
Interior, 768 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir. 1985), abrogated by Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209. 
 80. Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
 81. Final Determination to Acknowledge the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians of Michigan, 63 Fed. Reg. 56936-01 (Bureau of Indian Affairs Oct. 23, 
1998).  
 82. Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d 702, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
 83. Id. 
 84. Notice of Final Agency Determination to Take Land into Trust Under 25 CFR Part 
151, 70 Fed. Reg. 25596-02 (Bureau of Indian Affairs May 13, 2005). 
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Act and the National Environmental Policy Act.
85
 Although the district 
court initially issued a stay of the agency action, it later dismissed the suit, 
with the D.C. Circuit affirming in April 2008.
86
 Shortly after the dismissal, 
some three years after publication of the Secretary’s intent to take the land 
into trust, David Patchak filed his own challenge to the trust decision under 
the APA and sought an injunction to bar the acquisition.
87
  
Patchak alleged that because the Band was only recognized in 1999, it 
was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and the Secretary therefore had 
no authority to take land into trust for its benefit.
88
 To establish standing, 
Patchak argued that taking the Bradley Property into trust for gaming 
purposes would adversely impact him as a neighbor of the parcel by 
bringing millions of visitors into the area each year, increasing crime, 
traffic, and pollution, and decreasing property values.
89
 Patchak made no 
personal claim to the Bradley Property.
90
 The request for injunction was 
mooted in January 2009 when the Secretary took the land into trust after the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the MichGO case.
91
 On February 24, the 
Supreme Court decided Carcieri v. Salazar, agreeing with Patchak that 
Secretarial authority under IRA section 5 was limited to tribes that had been 
under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
92
 Regardless of the relevance of 
Carcieri, the district court dismissed the suit for lack of prudential standing, 
as Patchak’s interests “actively r[a]n contrary to” the IRA’s zone-of-
interests.
93
 
Although it recognized the opinions of its sister circuits, the D.C. Circuit 
reversed, holding the QTA to be inoperative as Patchak made no personal 
claim to the Bradley Property.
94
 Absent the immunity provided by the QTA, 
the APA controlled, and Patchak’s suit could move forward for further 
                                                                                                             
 85. Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Norton, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2018); National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2018)). 
 86. Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009). 
 87. Patchak v. Salazar, 646 F. Supp. 2d 72, 74 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209, 213 (2012). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 214.  
 92. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009).  
 93. Patchak, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 78.  
 94. Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d 702, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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proceedings.
95
 The court further held that Patchak’s “intense and obvious” 
interests satisfied the requirements of prudential standing.
96
  
A. Patchak I  
1. Majority Decision 
Acknowledging the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and, in a near unanimous decision, affirmed the conclusion of the D.C. 
Circuit.
97
 The Supreme Court concerned itself with two separate issues: 
first, whether the sovereign immunity arising from the QTA shielded the 
United States from Patchak’s suit; and second, if it did not, whether Patchak 
had prudential standing to allow his challenge to proceed.
98
 Since Patchak 
brought his suit under the APA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity, the 
Supreme Court considered that issue first.
99
  
The APA general waiver of sovereign immunity exposes the United 
States to suits—like Patchak’s—that seek non-monetary relief to address 
the action or inaction of a federal agency or its employee under color of 
legal authority.
100
 The waiver does not apply whenever “any other statute 
that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is 
sought” by the claimant.101 Because the Secretary continued to argue that 
the Indian lands exception of the QTA became operative after the United 
States acquired title to the Bradley Property, thus fulfilling the APA “carve-
out,” the Supreme Court shifted its focus to the QTA.102  
The QTA waives immunity when the plaintiff brings a quiet title suit 
against the government by asserting a “right, title, or interest” in real 
property that conflicts with the claimed ownership or interest of the United 
States.
103
 This suit authorization, however, “does not apply to trust or 
restricted Indian lands.”104 When this exception applies, it works to “retain 
the United States’ immunity from suit.”105 The question then became 
                                                                                                             
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 707. 
 97. Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209, 228 (2012). 
 98. Id. at 212.  
 99. Id. at 215.  
 100. Id.  
 101. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018). 
 102. Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 215.  
 103. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(d) (2018). 
 104. Id. § 2409a(a).  
 105. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 842 (1986).  
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whether Patchak had indeed brought a quiet title suit as stipulated by the 
QTA, thereby barring his demand for relief.
106
  
Although Patchak’s suit did attempt to “strip the United States of title to 
the land,” the Supreme Court determined that the QTA Indian lands 
exception applied only to actions in which the plaintiff claimed a private 
interest in the property.
107
 The Supreme Court found justification for this 
determination in two of its prior decisions: Block v. North Dakota ex rel. 
Board of University & School Lands
108
 and United States v. Mottaz.
109
 In 
Block, the Supreme Court held that North Dakota, as an adverse claimant to 
the United States, could not bypass the QTA’s statute of limitations by 
seeking alternative statutory remedies, including the APA.
110
 In Mottaz, the 
Supreme Court held that when plaintiffs themselves assert title to the 
property in question, the QTA governs the suit.
111
 Therefore, the “defining 
feature of a QTA action” is for the plaintiff to seek to protect a claim 
antagonistic to a property interest of the federal government.
112
 Patchak, 
unlike the Block and Mottaz plaintiffs, never raised an argument that he 
personally held claim to the land or had any actual right to possess it.
113
 
Because he only argued that the taking of the land into trust violated the 
IRA, his suit is a “garden-variety APA claim,” and the QTA’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity applies.
114
 
The Supreme Court analysis then turned to whether prudential standing 
grounds should bar Patchak’s suit.115 To bring suit under the APA, Patchak 
must fall within its “aggrieved” standard, meaning that Article III injury-in-
fact requirements are satisfied and the “interest he asserts [is] ‘arguably 
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute’ that 
he says was violated.”116 In keeping with the APA’s “generous review 
provisions,” the zone-of-interests test favors judicial review and allows for 
all benefit of the doubt to go to the plaintiff.
117
 It only bars a suit when the 
                                                                                                             
 106. Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 215.  
 107. Id. at 232.  
 108. 461 U.S. 273 (1983).  
 109. 476 U.S. 834 (1986).  
 110. Block, 461 U.S. at 277.  
 111. Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 841-42.  
 112. Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 220. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 220-21.  
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(1970)).  
 117. Id. at 225 (citing Clarke v. Secs. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)). 
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interest of the plaintiff is “so marginally related to or inconsistent with the 
purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that 
Congress intended to permit the suit.”118  
The Secretary contended that section 5 of the IRA—with its stated 
purpose of providing land for tribes—focuses on land acquisition, making 
Patchak’s interests in the land’s use as a casino insufficient for purposes of 
standing.
119
 The Supreme Court disagreed, saying that when considered in 
context of the IRA’s overarching goal to “rehabilitate the Indian’s 
economic life,”120 section 5 “functions as a primary mechanism to foster 
Indian tribes’ economic development.”121 Furthermore, because DOI 
regulations require the Secretary to consider the “purposes for which the 
land will be used”122 and the “potential conflicts of land use which may 
arise,”123 whenever land is taken into trust, it is done “with at least one eye 
directed toward how tribes will use those lands to support economic 
development.”124  
Because section 5 land-into-trust decisions are “closely enough and often 
enough entwined with considerations of land use to make that difference 
immaterial,” the Supreme Court concluded that the interests of neighbors 
who may suffer “economic, environmental, or aesthetic” harm are within 
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the IRA and are open to 
judicial review under the APA.
125
 After holding that neither the QTA 
sovereign immunity nor the doctrine of prudential standing worked to bar 
Patchak’s suit, the Court remanded the case to the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia for consideration on the merits.
126
 
2. Dissent  
Justice Sotomayor filed the only dissenting opinion and argued that the 
QTA should bar Patchak’s suit. She contended that allowing a plaintiff to 
strip the government of title to Indian land held in trust using the APA 
effectively nullified the QTA, which Congress and the executive branch 
intended to be the sole process to resolve property disputes with the United 
                                                                                                             
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973). 
 121. Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 226.  
 122. 25 C.F.R. § 151.10(c) (2018).  
 123. Id. § 151.10(f).  
 124. Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 226.  
 125. Id. at 227-28.  
 126. Id. at 228.  
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States.
127
 Such divestment is relief that has been specifically prohibited by 
the QTA.
128
 That Congress did not expressly exclude suits like Patchak’s—
which asserts only a weak interest in the disputed property rather than an 
ordinary quiet title action—is of no issue, as the APA carve-out is satisfied 
even if the relief Patchak seeks is only impliedly forbidden.
129
  
Unlike the majority, Justice Sotomayor considered the real-world 
consequences to be suffered by Indian Country. She first recognized that 
the Indian land exception reflects congressional acknowledgement of the 
“specific commitments” and “solemn obligations” the government has 
made with and to the Indians via treaty and other agreements.
130
 She then 
chided the majority for obliterating the thirty-day regulatory window for 
judicial review, as extending that window to the APA six-year statute of 
limitations only frustrates the IRA’s central goal of encouraging tribal 
economic development.
131
 
B. The Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act 
One secretarial argument put forward in Patchak I seemed to garner the 
slim support of the Supreme Court; the DOI urged that Patchak’s suit 
should be treated like that of an adverse claimant because both pose an 
equal risk of harm to tribal interests, which the Indian land exception 
purposefully seeks to protect.
132
 While the Supreme Court conceded that the 
argument was persuasive, it only said that “perhaps Congress would—
perhaps Congress should” decide that the harms be treated exactly the same 
under the QTA.
133
 While the case was on remand, Congress spoke—at least 
partially—on the issue by passing the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation 
Act (“Gun Lake Act”).134 It stated that:  
(a) IN GENERAL. —The land taken into trust by the United 
States for the benefit of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band 
of Pottawatomi Indians . . . is reaffirmed as trust land, and the 
actions of the Secretary of the Interior in taking that land into 
trust are ratified and confirmed.  
                                                                                                             
 127. Id. at 231 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 128. Id. at 228.  
 129. Id. at 236 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 130. Id. at 229 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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 133. Id. at 224.  
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(b) NO CLAIMS. —Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of 
the date of enactment of this Act) relating to the land described 
in subsection (a) shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal 
court and shall be promptly dismissed.
135
 
Over Patchak’s objection that the Gun Lake Act impermissibly infringed 
on the Article III power of the judicial branch, the district court dismissed 
his suit for lack of jurisdiction and held that there existed “no constitutional 
obstacle” to stop the Act’s enforcement.136 The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed 
the dismissal, holding that the plain language of the Gun Lake Act did strip 
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction regarding the Bradley 
Property.
137
 It further held that because Congress had supplied new law 
rather than “direct[ing] the result of pending litigation” as prohibited by 
Article III, the Gun Lake Act was constitutionally sound and the dismissal 
appropriate.
138
  
C. Patchak II  
1. Majority Decision 
The Supreme Court again granted certiorari, and in a plurality opinion 
written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, and Kagan, 
affirmed the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court.
139
 It began by first 
distinguishing between “permissible exercises of the legislative power and 
impermissible infringements of the judicial power.”140 The Constitution 
created three branches of government, giving “[t]o the legislative 
department . . . the duty of making laws; to the executive the duty of 
executing them; and to the judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying 
them in cases properly brought before the courts.”141 This separation of 
powers works to keep Congress from exercising judicial power properly 
vested in the judiciary under Article III.
142
 Congress oversteps these bounds 
whenever it “usurp[s] a court’s power to interpret and apply the law to the 
                                                                                                             
 135. Id. § 2(a)-(b), 128 Stat. at 1913. 
 136. Patchak v. Jewell, 109 F. Supp. 3d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 2015).  
 137. Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
 138. Id. at 1002.  
 139. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. 897, 903 (2018) (plurality opinion).  
 140. Id. at 905.  
 141. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S 447, 488 (1923).  
 142. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
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[circumstances] before it.”143 However, because the legislative power is the 
power to make law, Congress does have the authority to “make laws that 
apply retroactively to pending lawsuits, even when it effectively ensures 
that one side wins.”144  
The rule, then, is that Article III is violated whenever Congress forces a 
particular result or finding under an old law, but is not violated when 
Congress chooses instead to change the law.
145
 A jurisdiction-stripping 
statute addresses “a court’s competence to adjudicate a particular category 
of cases,”146 and for purposes of Article III, constitutes a change in the law 
within Congress’s permissible legislative authority.147 Section 2(b) of the 
Gun Lake Act removes from all federal courts the jurisdiction to hear any 
action that relates to the Bradley Property, includes no exceptions, and 
forces dismissal as its single judicial consequence.
148
 Because section 2(b) 
only addresses “a court’s competence to adjudicate a particular category of 
cases,” it can only be read and understood as a jurisdiction-stripping 
statute.
149
  
The ability to create a jurisdiction-stripping statute is a result of Article 
I,
150
 which grants to Congress the great power to establish lower federal 
courts and inherently includes the “lesser power to ‘limit the jurisdiction of 
those Courts.’”151 Jurisdiction is the “power to declare the law,” so 
jurisdiction-stripping statutes do not themselves involve “the exercise of 
judicial power” or constitute “legislative interference with courts in the 
exercising of continuing jurisdiction.”152 Moreover, in most instances, a 
grant of jurisdiction from Congress is required before the exercise of 
judicial power, meaning that an Act of Congress can “restrain[ ] the courts 
from acting at certain times, and even restrain[ ] them from acting 
permanently regarding certain subjects.”153 Consequently, stripping federal 
courts of jurisdiction is a valid power of Congress on par with declaring 
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war, laying taxes, and coining money.
154
 The power is plenary unless it 
violates some other constitutional provision.
155
  
Patchak did not dispute that Congress had the power to remove 
jurisdiction from federal courts.
156
 He countered, however, that even if 
section 2(b) did permissibly strip courts of jurisdiction, it violated Article 
III on other grounds—firstly, because it “flatly directs” dismissal without 
allowing federal courts to interpret or apply any new law, and secondly, 
because it interfered with the Supreme Court’s decision in Patchak I.157 The 
Supreme Court quickly dispensed with both arguments.  
Section 2(b) does not direct dismissal under old law; instead, it is a 
newly created law for challenges “relating to” the Bradley Property, and the 
District Court did correctly interpret and apply that standard to Patchak’s 
suit.
158
 Even the mandatory language of section 2(b)—“shall be promptly 
dismissed”—does not direct an outcome but rather imposes dismissal as the 
consequence of a court’s determination that it does not have jurisdiction to 
hear a suit related to the Bradley Property.
159
 The Supreme Court found 
Patchak’s reliance on United States v. Klein unpersuasive.160 In Klein, the 
estate of a former Confederate soldier brought suit to recover property 
seized by the federal government during the Civil War, but a statute 
required claimants to prove their loyalty in order to reclaim.
161
 The soldier 
received a pardon prior to death, which the Supreme Court previously held 
proved loyalty under the statute.
162
 After the estate received a favorable 
judgment, Congress passed a second statute declaring pardons proof of 
disloyalty.
163
 The second statute mandated that when a claimant has 
accepted a pardon, the jurisdiction of the court hearing his suit ceased, and 
his suit must be dismissed.
164
 Even in settled suits, the statute instructed the 
Supreme Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
165
 The Supreme Court in 
Klein held the second statute to be an infringement of both the executive 
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 156. Id. at 908.  
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and judicial powers.
166
 Unlike the impermissible statute in Klein, section 
2(b) does not exercise a power vested in another branch of government nor 
does it strip jurisdiction selectively.
167
 Instead, section 2(b) removes the 
Bradley Property wholly from federal jurisdiction, which is entirely within 
the legislative power of Congress.
168
 
As to Patchak’s second argument, while Article III does forbid Congress 
from “retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final 
judgments,”169 section 2(b) does not disturb a final judgment, as Patchak I 
did not provide one; it only remanded the suit back to the district court for 
further proceedings on the merits.
170
 ”Congress has the power to ‘apply 
newly enacted, outcome-altering legislation in pending civil cases,’” even 
when it seems to unfairly target specific cases like it does here.
171
 As 
Patchak’s suit lacks a final judgment, section 2(b)’s reference to “pending” 
cases applies, and Article III is not implicated.
172
 Because the Gun Lake Act 
did not violate Article III of the Constitution, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the dismissal of Patchak’s suit.173 
2. Concurrences 
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that when read in context with 
section 2(a), which reaffirms the property as trust land, application of 
section 2(b) brings about the “same real-world result” as the first section: 
keeping the Bradley Property in trust.
174
 Section 2(b) “simplifies judicial 
decisionmaking” by making the only determination of the court whether the 
lawsuit before it relates to the Bradley Property.
175
 Accordingly, the whole 
statute “need not be read to do more than eliminate the cost of litigating a 
lawsuit that will inevitably uphold the land’s trust status.”176 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, joined by Justice Sotomayor, begins 
simply: “What Congress grants, it may retract.”177 While Congress must 
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first give consent to suit, which the Supreme Court concluded it did in 
Patchak I under the APA general waiver of sovereign immunity,
178
 
Congress may also reinstate its sovereign immunity at any time.
179
 This is 
true even when litigation is pending.
180
 Because the Gun Lake Act operated 
as an effective restoration of immunity, Justice Ginsburg argued, the 
Supreme Court need not look further to resolve Patchak’s suit.181 
While Justice Sotomayor agreed with several aspects of the dissent—
namely, that Congress may not direct an entry of judgment for a particular 
party, and that removing jurisdiction over a single suit is not enough to 
constitute a change in the law—she, like Justice Ginsburg, would read the 
Gun Lake Act as restoring federal sovereign immunity.
182
 The majority of 
Patchak I (Sotomayor reminds us she was the single dissenter) recognized 
that Congress could bar lawsuits pertaining to the government’s ownership 
of the land at issue.
183
 Because the Gun Lake Act is “most naturally read” 
as restoring sovereign immunity, Justice Sotomayor would affirm on that 
basis alone and avoid the separation-of-powers analysis regarding 
jurisdiction-stripping statutes.
184
 
3. Dissent  
Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices 
Kennedy and Gorsuch, which scolded the plurality for giving Congress the 
unqualified authority to decide the outcome of a single pending case “in 
favor of the litigant it preferred, under a law adopted just for the 
occasion.”185 He explained that the Framers’ explicitly established the 
judiciary separate from the legislature and the executive, dividing power 
and authority amongst the three because of a “concern that a legislature 
should not be able unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one 
person.”186 When the Gun Lake Act was passed in 2014, there were no 
other pending suits relating to the Bradley Property, and no other challenges 
could be filed as the APA six-year statute of limitations had expired.
187
 That 
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Congress sought to “target [Patchak] for adverse treatment and direct the 
precise disposition of his pending case” is obvious.188  
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts argued, nothing in the language of 
section 2(b) suggests it even is a jurisdiction-stripping statute. The Supreme 
Court in other cases set out a clear rule, requiring Congress to have plainly 
stated its intention that a statutory limitation further poses a jurisdiction 
restriction; without a plain statement, the Supreme Court has treated it as 
non-jurisdictional.
189
 Even if section 2(b) is jurisdictional, when, as here, 
Congress uses its power to manipulate jurisdictional rules to direct the 
outcome of pending litigation, it has impermissibly assumed the role of 
judge and violated Article III.
190
 More egregious is that with the dismissal 
of his federal case, Patchak is left with no alternative means of review, as 
state courts cannot exercise civil jurisdiction over trust land unless the tribe 
gives its consent.
191
 
Chief Justice Roberts ends his dissent by disagreeing with Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor that section 2(b) should be read as restoring 
sovereign immunity, as Congress did not express an “unambiguous 
intention to withdraw” a remedy as required, nor did the Gun Lake Act use 
any language (“immunity,” “consent to be sued,” “United States,”) that 
suggests an intention to restore immunity.
192
 He also dismissed Justice 
Breyer’s approval of section 2(b) for making judicial determinations 
simpler and eliminating litigation costs as “cavalier euphemisms for 
exercising the judicial power.”193 Such an exercise works by “relieving the 
Judiciary of its job,” making section 2(b) a transgression of the proper 
allocation of powers under the Constitution.
194
 
III. Analysis 
A. The Convergence of Patchak I and Carcieri Unduly Delays Economic 
Development of Newly Acquired Tribal Lands 
Patchak I and Carcieri amount to a double-failure of the Supreme Court 
to support and enforce the ultimate purpose of the IRA: to give tribal 
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nations more control over their own economic well-being. While the 
Carcieri decision was bad enough, it appeared to apply only to parcels that 
received an affirmative final determination but had not yet been formally 
taken into trust. This is evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court in its 
decision did not disturb nor even consider a previous 1800-acre parcel that 
was taken into trust for the Narragansett Tribe in 1988.
195
 But Patchak I 
takes Carcieri a step further and leaves what would have otherwise been a 
settled trust decision open to collateral attack and possible retroactive 
divestment.
196
 
Patchak I also allows for a wider group of plaintiffs to challenge a trust 
decision and significantly extends the time in which those plaintiffs can file 
a challenge. Prior to Patchak I, a plaintiff with “aesthetic” or 
“environmental” concerns surrounding trust land use could bring suit under 
other applicable statutes, such as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act or the 
National Environmental Policy Act, which were subject to the APA six-
year statute of limitations.
197
 After Patchak I, any plaintiff may challenge 
the government’s decision to take land into trust subject to the APA, so 
long as he does not make a personal claim of an interest in the land.
198
  
 In an effort to limit the uncertainties brought about by the Patchak I 
decision, the BIA released its own “Patchak Patch,” a series of significant 
amendments to its 25 C.F.R. Part 151 fee-to-trust regulations.
199
 The final 
rule, published in November 2013, eliminated the prior thirty-day waiting 
period, meaning land is immediately taken into trust after the final 
determination to acquire land.
200
 Secondly, the final rule established that 
any “interested parties” in an acquisition must make themselves known to 
the BIA in writing prior to the final decision so that they may later receive 
written notice of the final decision.
201
 It further required the BIA to publish 
notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the affected area to inform 
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unknown interested parties and specified that the APA statute-of-limitations 
began to run upon first publication of such newspaper notice.
202
 Thirdly, the 
final rule distinguished between decisions issued by BIA officials and the 
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs. If a BIA official issues the decision, 
interested parties have thirty days following in which they must exhaust all 
administrative remedies before seeking APA review; if they fail to do so, 
judicial review is unavailable to them.
203
 If the decision is instead issued by 
the Assistant Secretary, the decision is final and not subject to 
administrative review.
204
 While this regulatory fix is helpful, it is not itself a 
solution, as tribes still must wait six years and hope that a challenge does 
not arise that divests the United States of title.  
Although Patchak II does provide a better remedy to Patchak I and 
Carcieri, having each individual tribe attempt to persuade Congress to pass 
specific legislation every time it seeks to protect trust property is at best an 
incomplete solution, if not a nearly useless one. It unduly burdens tribes 
that have already endured the years or decades long fee-to-trust process to 
even convince the government to take the land into trust in the first place. 
Even if a tribe had favorable legislation introduced each time, the process to 
then have that legislation passed is protracted and the chance of success 
unknown. 
B. The Patchak II Remedy Fails to Solve the Problems of Patchak I and 
Carcieri 
That the Patchak II remedy provides no real finality is evidenced in 
Littlefield v. United States Department of Interior,
205
 which involved a 
dispute regarding a trust acquisition for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe 
(“the Mashpee”). The Mashpee Tribe, located on the southeast coast of 
Cape Cod, Massachusetts, was federally recognized by the DOI in 2007.
206
 
Having no federal reservation, the Mashpee filed its fee-to-trust application 
soon after, seeking to place into trust a 170-acre parcel in the town of 
Mashpee and a second 150-acre parcel in the nearby town of Taunton.
207
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The Taunton site was intended for economic development in the form of a 
“400,000 [square-foot] gaming-resort complex.”208 The generated revenue 
would be used to aid tribal members directly and fund cultural preservation 
efforts and other vital tribal programs.
209
  
On September 25, 2015, the DOI published notice of its final decision to 
take both parcels into trust, making it the “initial reservation” of the 
Mashpee.
210
 The DOI premised its decision on extensive recorded history 
that showed the Mashpee had existed continuously in the area set aside for 
it by the colonial government and that both the United States and the State 
of Massachusetts recognized its ownership and control of the land.
211
 This 
history caused the DOI to treat the area as a “‘reservation’ for purposes of 
the IRA”, making the Mashpee qualified to take land into trust “under the 
second definition of ‘Indian.’”212 Consequently, the DOI did not determine 
whether the Mashpee also met the first definition as qualified by the 
Carcieri decision.
213
 Both parcels were taken into trust November 10, 
2015.
214
 The Mashpee quickly began development on Massachusetts’s first 
full-scale resort casino, at an estimated cost of $1 billion.
215
 
Residents of Taunton (“the Littlefields”) filed suit under the APA to 
challenge the decision in February 2016.
216
 They specifically challenged the 
DOI’s interpretation and application of the second IRA definition of 
“Indian.”217 Whether the Mashpee met the second definition as 
“descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within 
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation” turned on further 
definition of the term “such members.”218 The Littlefields argued that “such 
members” plainly referred to the phrase “all persons of Indian descendent 
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who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal 
jurisdiction” in the first definition.219 This interpretation would, in line with 
the Carcieri decision, also limit the second definition to those tribes under 
federal jurisdiction in 1934.
220
 The DOI countered that because “such 
members” is ambiguous, the Secretary did reasonably interpret it to refer 
only to “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized 
Indian tribe,” making the temporal limitation absent in the second 
definition.
221
 
The court sided with the Littlefields and concluded that the word “such” 
in the second definition clearly referred to the “members” described in the 
first definition, integrating the 1934 restriction into both.
222
 It based its 
conclusion on the plain meaning of the word “such” (defined as “of the 
character, quality, or extent previously indicated or implied”) and found 
there to be no language in the IRA that would suggest it referred only to a 
portion of the antecedent phrase.
223
 It dismissed the DOI argument that such 
a reading rendered the second definition “entirely surplus.”224 The court 
explained that the two definitions remained distinct.
225
 The first definition 
requires actual membership in a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction in 
1934.
226
 The second definition encompasses the descendants of members 
who were under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and were living on reservations 
at that time.
227
 After holding that the second definition unambiguously 
incorporated the first, the court declared the Secretary lacked authority to 
acquire land for the Mashpee, and on July 28, 2016, it remanded the issue 
back to the agency for further proceedings.
228
 While the DOI—then under 
the Trump administration—did initially appeal, it later asked for and was 
granted voluntary dismissal in May 2017.
229
 
Fearful of the DOI’s refusal to continue to defend the trust status of its 
reservation in court, the Mashpee utilized the Patchak II remedy.
230
 In 
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March 2018, the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe Reservation Reaffirmation 
Act (“the Mashpee Act”) was introduced in the House and Senate.231 Like 
the Gun Lake Act, the Mashpee Act reaffirms the reservation as trust land 
and requires that all actions pending in federal court relating to the 
reservation be dismissed.
232
 Neither bill gave new or special rights to the 
Mashpee.
233
 Both bills had bipartisan support, and passage was further 
encouraged by the City of Taunton, the National Congress of American 
Indians, numerous intertribal organizations, including the National Indian 
Gaming Association, and twenty-five individual tribes.
234
  
On September 7, 2018, two years following remand, the DOI issued its 
opinion that in light of the Littlefield holding, the Mashpee had not been 
under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and the DOI therefore lacked authority to 
take land into trust on its behalf.
235
 Answering whether the Mashpee had 
been under proper federal jurisdiction required the determination of 
whether the United States had taken any action establishing or reflecting 
federal responsibility for or over the Mashpee in or before 1934, and if it 
did, whether that status remained intact in 1934.
236
 The DOI explained that 
while there existed significant dealings with the State of Massachusetts, 
little to no evidence of significant contact between the United States and the 
Mashpee via treaty, legislation, or federal administrative action existed.
237
 
Absent indicia of federal jurisdiction, the Mashpee failed to qualify under 
either the IRA’s first or second definitions of “Indian.”238  
In response to the DOI decision, and to supplement the pending 
legislation, the Mashpee filed suit against the agency in the Federal District 
Court for the District of Columbia.
239
 The complaint argues that the 
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judgment is contrary to law and asks the court to set it aside as arbitrary and 
capricious.
240
 The Mashpee also appealed the Littlefield decision, which 
remains pending in the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals.
241
 Until all legal 
challenges are finalized, the DOI will continue to hold the land in trust.
242
  
Because the IRA is the only vehicle by which the Mashpee can acquire 
trust land, if the trust status of its reservation is rescinded, the Mashpee will 
be effectively landless unless and until Congress chooses to act. Feeling 
“utterly abandoned by [its] federal trustee,” the Mashpee Tribe continues to 
petition Congress for passage of its Act.
243
 Mashpee Chairman Cedric 
Cromwell has said that if the reservation is lost, the “ability to operate as a 
tribal government would be crushed.”244 Even just the uncertainty 
surrounding the trust status has caused the Tribe “a massive loss of 
resources and services” meant to aid Mashpee citizens.245  
The Mashpee Act was reintroduced with identical language on January 8, 
2019, after it failed to make any progress in the previous Congress.
246
 
Although it still has bipartisan support and the widespread backing of 
Indian Country, challengers to the legislation remain.
247
 Lawmakers from 
Connecticut and Rhode Island have resisted its passage, and competing 
gaming operators continue to be vocal in their opposition.
248
 Despite federal 
acknowledgement of its aboriginal existence, and after having spent eight 
years inside the bureaucratic fee-to-trust process and another four in court 
and before Congress, there does not appear to be an end in sight for the 
Mashpee. The Patchak II remedy appears to be no remedy at all.  
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C. Congress Must Step in to Prevent Another Devastating Shift in Federal 
Indian Policy 
The Littlefield judgement, along with the DOI choosing not to challenge 
it, is a dangerous precedent for Indian Country that has led tribal leaders to 
call it the dawning of a new termination era.
249
 This ominous conclusion is 
supported by a new draft proposal to further change the 25 C.F.R. Part 151 
fee-to-trust regulations.
250
 These new amendments would require the BIA 
to “comply with a final court order and any resulting judicial remedy, 
including . . . taking land out of trust."
251
 Based on the holdings of 
Littlefield, Carcieri, and Patchak I, federal courts are no more likely than 
the current administration to protect Indian property interests.  
Perhaps it is the rise and success of Indian gaming that is changing the 
judicial attitude toward tribes, making the trust doctrine and canons of 
construction seem superfluous as tribes are no longer perceived as being 
“weak or financially defenseless.” 252 This attitude is bolstered by the public 
perception that when a tribe takes land into trust it will—no matter the 
stated purpose—always build a casino, and that resulting revenue is or can 
be used to buy political power and influence.
253
 Gaming, in fact, “has 
produced the single largest infusion of income into Indian country in 
history.”254 When the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was passed in 1988, 
total revenue from Indian gaming equaled $100 million.
255
 In 2016, Indian 
gaming generated $31.2 billion,
256
 nearly half of the United States casino 
industry’s $70.16 billion gross gaming revenue.257  
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What must be remembered, however, is that this staggering amount is 
not spread equally across Indian Country or among the 573 federally 
recognized tribes.
258
 The $31.2 billion was generated by 244 tribes across 
twenty-eight states, with fifty-seven percent of that revenue being generated 
by smaller gaming operations that grossed less than $25 million.
259
 Even 
this amount, though substantial, is likely not enough to create and maintain 
the social and economic programs necessary to lift and keep a tribe out of 
poverty. For the other 329 tribes (that either oppose gaming or are located 
in areas where gaming is not financially feasible), and for the tribes with 
gaming operations that barely pay for themselves, being in poverty or 
otherwise decidedly below middle-class remains the norm.
260
 Because it is 
simply beyond the ability of the average tribe to “exercise[ ] its political 
influence to persuade Congress to enact a narrow jurisdiction-stripping 
provision that effectively ends all lawsuits threatening its casino” or any 
other controversial economic development, the Patchak II remedy is 
unavailable to most of Indian Country.
261
 
The best remedy possible, then, is for Congress to exercise its plenary 
power to override the decision in Patchak I. As the Supreme Court 
previously held in Mottaz, the sole function of the Indian land exception in 
the QTA is to “retain the United States’ immunity from suit by third parties 
challenging the United States’ title to land held in trust for Indians.”262 
Therefore, Congress should legislatively affirm that any plaintiff who seeks 
to force government relinquishment of title should be barred, regardless of 
the strength or type of the plaintiff’s interest. The Supreme Court itself 
acknowledged that although Patchak did not seek to protect his own 
interest, the practical effect of his suit or any like it is to divest the 
government of its interest.
263
 But it also made clear that it is “for Congress 
to tell us, not for us to tell Congress” that the harms should be treated alike 
and barred under the QTA.
264
 
By passing legislation that safeguards acquired trust land from 
divestiture, Congress would acknowledge and affirm its duty as trustee to 
protect those Indian lands—something this Supreme Court and the 
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Executive have failed to do. Because the problems of Patchak I and 
Carcieri are inseparable, Congress should override both statutory 
interpretation decisions. That the purpose of the APA should yield to that of 
the IRA and the QTA is due to the special fiduciary relationship between 
tribes and the federal government.
265
 The chipping away of the fee-to-trust 
process is a new solution to the old Indian problem, an active pursuit of 
termination that Congress must stop to protect the ability of every tribe to 
not only meaningfully self-govern, but to exist.  
IV. Conclusion 
The ultimate purpose of the Indian Reorganization Act is to acquire land 
into trust for tribes on which to live and engage in economic development. 
This is undermined by the Patchak I and Carcieri decisions. Without the 
fee-to-trust process, tribes have few other opportunities to generate revenue 
to aid in the care of its citizens. The remedy provided by Patchak II is not 
sufficient to provide certainty concerning the status of trust lands. 
Therefore, Congress should exercise its plenary power over Indians to pass 
a congressional fix to both Patchak I and Carcieri. Doing so would affirm 
its trust responsibility and foster greater tribal self-determination.  
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